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Improving the quality of eutrified surface waters is often not achievable by merely 
lowering the external nutrient loads. After some threshold level, accelerated internal 
loading maintains the higher level of eutrophication despite changes in external loads. 
Therefore, it is often necessary to affect this internal nutrient load directly. The water 
quality can be improved by biomanipulation: intensive fishing of planktivorous and 
benthivorous fish species, such as roach species. Unfortunately these species do not have 
commercial value and therefore managers have to introduce a subsidy scheme for this 
fishing.  
 
In Finland, biomanipulation have been practised in several lakes where the manager of 
the lake has introduced a subsidy scheme to attract fishermen to undertake the required 
intensive fishing of these targeted species. If the subsidy scheme is properly initialised 
the manager achieve its’ objective: intensive fishing lower the level of the targeted stocks 
and eventually improved water quality. However due to the complexity of fishery 
dynamics the subsidy schemes have often failed to achieve the long term objective.  
 
In this paper we studied the optimal subsidy scheme and how these incentives affect 
fishermen behaviour in a game theoretic model. Within a bioeconomic model we 
illustrate the complexity of the setting even in a case of perfect information of stock 
dynamics and costs of fishing. We showed that the optimal subsidy scheme depends on 
whether or not there are any switching costs changing fishing method from commercial 
to subsidised fishing.  
 
In a case when it is costless for fisherman to change fishing method we derived 
equilibrium conditions for optimal subsidy scheme that produce a pure strategy Nash 
equilibrium (PSNE). There all fishermen have same strategy profile where they divide 
their fishing effort according to manager’s objective. In the case of switching costs, in 
optimum, fishermen have to specialise either one fisheries. Then there is no pure strategy 
Nash equilibrium and fishermen have to apply mixed strategy. We found that then 
optimal subsidy scheme produces a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium (MSNE). In 
equilibrium all fishermen have the same mixed strategy profile where fishermen 
randomise their fishing according to those probabilities.  
 
In PSNE all fishermen practise same mixed fisheries where they earn same profit. In 
MSNE the subsidy scheme equals the expected profits, but fishermen specialise in one 
fishing and realised profits are not the same. Subsidy levels are different in two cases, but 
they produce the same result. However, the subsidy scheme in PSNE produces the 
targeted fishing effort and environmental impact with certainty, while in MSNE the target 
level will be achieved only at expected level. Which subsidy scheme produces higher 
subsidy level depends on biological factors and prices as well as targeted stock level.  